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I.  INTRODUCTION
In late March 1999, Lois Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General for
the Environmental and Natural Resources Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, gave a speech at Yale Law School entitled Environ-
mental Protection Here and Abroad: The View from Justice.1  In dis-
cussing the international aspects of the Justice Department’s
environmental work, Ms. Schiffer brought up the enormous problem
of trade in illegally captured endangered species, citing an article that
appeared in the New York Times Sunday Magazine in 1997.2  That ar-
ticle used as its central example the endangered species trade from
the island of Madagascar—specifically, the trade in the Radiated Tor-
toise, an exquisite and now increasingly rare animal.  It is hunted by
local fishermen for pennies, traded up through various dingy half-way
houses for a few dollars, vacuumed into the international criminal
trade, and then finally sold to collectors for tens of thousands of dol-
lars.3
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1. Lois Schiffer, Address at Yale Law School (Mar. 25, 1999).
2. Donovan Webster, The Animal Smugglers: The LOOTING and SMUGGLING and
FENCING and HOARDING of IMPOSSIBLY PRECIOUS, FEATHERED and SCALY
WILD THINGS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
3. See id. at 27.
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Is this story an example of a global commons problem?  It seems
to be.  The “global” aspect of the story is easy to see, since this sad
tale describes one piece of the loss of biodiversity throughout the
planet.  But the “commons” aspect is present as well, in Garrett Har-
din’s sense of the commons as an unowned resource, open to all.4
Hardin famously used the example of grazing livestock in an open
field.5  In such cases, he said, each livestock owner takes all the gains
from allowing his animals to graze freely in the field, while receiving
only a fraction of any gains from conservation, and thus everyone’s
individual incentives favor overgrazing, even though this course of ac-
tion leads to collective disaster.6
The Madagascar Radiated Tortoise’s plight represents a cascade
of these scenarios.  As in Hardin’s commons example, the Madagas-
car turtle fishermen have no formal title to the larger stock of animals
and thus have every incentive to overfish and no incentive to con-
strain themselves or to invest in turtle habitats.  In turn, the various
levels of traders in turtles all vie with one another from low to high on
the commercial food chain, and at the end of the chain, even the cus-
tomers compete to get most of these unowned resources before other
customers beat them out.  In short, the Radiated Tortoise story pro-
vides a linked series of examples of what Hardin called the Tragedy of
the Commons.7  The tragedy unfolds in any situation in which it would
be in the collective interest of all the players to constrain their depre-
dation of some valuable resource—here the turtle population—and
instead invest in its preservation; but because no one owns the re-
source, everyone’s incentives are to grab now and let the devil take
the hindmost.
A similar analysis, teched up as an n-person prisoners’ dilemma,8
can be applied to all kinds of overhunting and overfishing scenarios,
air and water pollution, and indeed the whole range of environmental
problems.  Hardin himself drew the conclusion that “tragedies” of
this sort admit of only two possible cures: coercion on the one side, or
private property on the other.9  A follower of Hardin’s, William
Ophuls, politicized the “coercion” side of this duality into the concept
4. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. For an analysis of the prisoners’ dilemma when a large number of participants are in-
volved, see EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 25-27 (1977).
9. See Hardin, supra note 4, at 1247.
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of “Leviathan;”10 taken together, the Hardin/Ophuls position argues
that individuals can be kept from re-enacting the “tragedy” only by
the direct central command of the state, or alternatively, by the es-
tablishment of private property rights that align individual incentives
with resource conservation.
By now, of course, we have seen a whole generation of Levia-
than’s solutions to environmental problems, taking the form of com-
mand-and-control regulations.  But a certain disillusion about them
has set in; the high costs and inflexibility of command-and-control
regulations make them problematic even within particular countries.
They are even less suited to global problems, where any notion of Le-
viathan is seriously attenuated.  The obvious next question then be-
comes: What about the Hardin/Ophuls alternative—a property rights
regime to govern global common resources?  A moment’s thought,
however, raises an important preliminary question: Does the Har-
din/Ophuls choice, coercion or private property, exhaust the possible
options?
II.  EXPANDING THE CHOICES: COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES AND
TRADABLE ENVIRONMENTAL ALLOWANCES
A growing chorus of “new institutional economists” have argued
very persuasively that property and coercion are not the only routes
out of the dilemma that Hardin describes.11  Indeed, Hardin’s critics
begin with his very choice of rhetoric, objecting that he and his fol-
lowers spoke of  “the commons” when they should have used the
phrase “open access.”12  As Susan Buck Cox and others have amply
illustrated, there was no “tragedy of the commons” in the real com-
mons, that is, the historic grazing areas of medieval Europe.13  Quite
10. See WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYER, JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF
SCARCITY REVISITED 189 (1992) (citing Hobbes’ Leviathan for the proposition that in instances
of scarcity, governments must allocate resources in order to avoid conflicts); WILLIAM OPHULS,
ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 148 (1977).
11. For a sampling of this literature, see THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE
AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds.,
1987).
12. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 23 (1990) (describing “disas-
trous” effects of thinking that limited commons is the same as open access); Alison Rieser, Pre-
scriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 399-400 (1999) (reviewing critiques by Ostrom and others) [herein-
after Rieser, Prescriptions].
13. See Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49 (1985);
CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS
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the contrary, the medieval commons was a remarkably stable form of
resource management, one that lasted many centuries and that has
analogs in equally long-lived community fisheries, grazing areas, and
irrigation works the world over.14  Furthermore, critics of Hardin and
Ophuls take issue with their proposed solutions to the problems of
the so-called commons.  One well-known critic, Elinor Ostrom, has
particularly leveled her fire at the Hardin/Ophuls dyad—the idea that
successful resource management requires either Leviathan on the one
hand or individual property on the other.  Ostrom rejects this limita-
tion on the choices; her own work describes and analyzes the working
structures of common property regimes (CPRs) in all parts of the
world, regimes that are neither ordered by Leviathan nor divided into
individual property.15
Notice that a CPR is itself a type of property institution, that is, a
common property regime that puts an entire stock of a resource under
unitary and exclusive management.  Although the members of a
commonly used hunting ground or fishery may treat the resource as a
“commons” among themselves, with respect to the rest of the world
that resource is property.  As I have described these regimes else-
where, they may look like a commons on the inside, but they are
property on the outside;16 what James Acheson calls “perimeter de-
fense” is very much a part of any limited common property regime.17
Even with respect to the inside, a CPR may not be entirely wide-
open; the “insider” participants in a commonly managed fishery or ir-
rigation system are very likely to have access and entitlements only
according to strongly held sets of community norms, some of them
quite intricate.18  This is why the CPR literature has bolstered scholar-
ship in New Institutional Economics, fostering a whole new set of in-
OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION (1980).  For a new analysis, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).
14. See generally OSTROM, supra note 12.
15. See id. at 8-15, 58-61.  Ostrom also uses the abbreviation CPR, but for “common-pool
resources.” Id. at xiv, 13.  For a brief discussion of the terminology, see Paul Seabright, Manag-
ing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 114 n.1
(1993).
16. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144, 155 (1998) [hereinafter Rose, Sev-
eral Futures].
17. James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecological Effects of
Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note
11, at 37, 41.
18. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common
Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 283-84 (1996) (describing complex rules developed by residents
of medieval “fen” wetland areas for exploitation of various resources).
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tellectual endeavors that combine economics with sociology and that
analyze the evolution of the social norms that guide collective social
action.
An unspoken political agenda may well unite Hardin’s critics—
an agenda that reacts negatively to his suppression of the possibility
that people can work together voluntarily to overcome collective ac-
tion problems.  To the contrary, the CPR literature forcefully asserts
that people can and do come together in uncoerced common action
for the management of commonly held resources.19  Nevertheless, is-
sues concerning the global commons pose a particular challenge to
the social optimism of the CPR literature: however effective CPRs
might be for small-scale resources, they could be entirely ineffectual
on a large scale.  A new literature on social norms seems to be con-
verging on the view that while community regimes for managing
common property are not at all unusual, such regimes are very likely
to develop only under certain favorable circumstances.20  These cir-
cumstances can be predicted from transaction cost analysis.  Critically
important are opportunities for mutual monitoring and social lever-
age; small group size helps to produce these opportunities, as do pre-
existing familial and social relations.  Robert Ellickson, a leading fig-
ure in the new norms literature, predicts that norms are likely to
emerge to overcome collective action problems in what he calls
“close-knit groups,” but he is agnostic about whether this can occur
on a larger scale or among strangers.21
According to the new norms literature, then, we should expect
that CPRs might emerge to govern small-scale resource stocks, such
as local reef fisheries or mountain pastures, but that these governance
regimes will be more problematic for large-scale stocks like ocean
fisheries or the atmospheric ozone layer.  Indeed, CPRs may even
damage those larger resource stocks.  Ellickson, for example, has de-
scribed the evolution of norms among nineteenth century whalers.
Whalers’ norms clearly fostered cooperative efforts that permitted
groups of seamen to capture whales efficiently, but if anything, their
19. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 13, at 152-54 (describing medieval peasants’ agreements to
adopt scattered plots as an efficient way to manage collective use of common fields).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 177-78 (1991) (describing preconditions for effective social norms) [hereinafter
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW].
21. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE  L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (1993) (noting the
limitation of his norms thesis to close-knit groups) [hereinafter Ellickson, Property in Land];
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 20, at 177-78.
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group hunting efficiency only hastened the decimation of the larger
whale populations.22
Taken together, these points seem to suggest that the CPR litera-
ture is simply irrelevant to global environmental issues, where the
problems require the coordinated management of vast and far-flung
resources that are used by diverse and heterogenous groups.  This un-
fortunate fact, if true, would seem to cast us back on the Har-
din/Ophuls dual alternatives, the choice between coercion and indi-
vidual property.
On closer inspection, however, global commons problems have
many components that are much more localized.  Global warming
from carbon dioxide may be a planet-wide environmental issue, yet
forests that sequester carbon can be highly localized.  The world’s
fisheries taken together are in danger, but many specific fisheries are
located in local shoals.  Water pollution is a problem throughout the
earth, but each watershed can be broken down into a number of spe-
cific communities.  Biodiversity loss has worldwide consequences, but
species extinction often plays out in highly localized areas, like Ha-
waiian forests,23 or indeed like the remote areas of Madagascar where
Radiated Tortoises breed.
These local densities in the global commons have already given
rise to some thought about the role of CPRs in global environmen-
talism.  Alison Rieser, for example, has suggested that some fishing
quotas be allocated to communities rather than to individuals,24 while
Lee Breckenridge has argued that in some cases, both human rights
and global environmental problems might be addressed simultane-
ously by allocating collective property rights in rainforest ecosystems
to local indigenous communities.25
22. See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 20, at 206.
23. See W.S. Merwin, In Hawaii’s Trees, Little Gems of Diversity are Dwindling, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at G4 (describing Hawaii’s great loss of biodiversity); A.P. Dobson, Geo-
graphic Distribution of Endangered Species in the United States, 275 SCI. 550, 551 (1997) (re-
porting findings that Hawaii is one of a few areas of concentration of endangered species, and
more generally, that most endangered species in U.S. are concentrated in relatively limited land
areas or “hot spots”).
24. See Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries: Con-
tracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 824-29 (1997) [hereinafter Rieser, Property
Rights].
25. See Lee Breckenridge, Protection of Biological and Cultural Diversity: Emerging Rec-
ognition of Local Community Rights in Ecosystems Under International Environmental Law, 59
TENN. L. REV. 735, 739-53, 775-85 (1992); see also Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital
Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity, 16
U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 226 (1997).
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In spite of these suggestions about the usefulness of CPRs, how-
ever, the market-oriented and property-based solutions now most
discussed for global commons problems have not been derived from
CPRs at all, but rather from models that focus on individual property
rights.  Among these are the privatization proposals from free market
environmentalists.26  In one much-discussed instance, for example, the
Merck pharmaceutical firm contracted with Costa Rica to preserve
rainforests, reserving bio-prospecting rights for itself and remunerat-
ing Costa Rica’s preservation efforts by the promise of royalties in fu-
ture medicines.27  But the veritable poster-child for property and mar-
ket solutions is the set of models referred to as “hybrid property” by
Richard Stewart;28 here the most notable example is the regime of
tradable emission allowances that the United States has instituted to
control the acid rain precursor sulfur dioxide.
In the years since 1990, when the Clean Air Act Amendments29
instituted this highly acclaimed scheme of tradable emissions allow-
ances, proponents of tradable environmental rights have spread the
idea to other areas, including matters of global environmental con-
cern.  Tradable allowances have been widely discussed and partially
implemented in ocean fisheries, where they appear as individual
fishing quotas (IFQs) for some fish stocks.30  Similarly, tradable al-
lowances are a key issue in the current worldwide debate over the re-
duction of greenhouse gases.  Even the resistant industrialists of the
United States seem to be more willing to go along with global green-
house gas reduction schemes if these schemes permit emissions trad-
ing.31
This article focuses in part on these hybrid property schemes, or
“tradable environmental allowance” (TEA) systems, not only be-
26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE
OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 218-24 (1995) (advocating a turnover of some public land to pri-
vate ownership).
27. See Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights, Genetic Resources, and Biotechnological Change,
35 J.L. & ECON. 199, 209-10 (1992).
28. See Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
91, 93 (1990); see also James E. Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449,
453 (1994); Rose, Several Futures, supra note 16, at 164.
29. Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-51(o) (Supp. 1999).
30. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the Sustainable
Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 807 (1997); RIGHTS-BASED FISHING (Philip A. Neher et
al. eds., 1989).  IFQs are also often referred to as “individual transferable quotas” or “ITQs.”
See Carrie A. Tipton, Note, Protecting Tomorrow’s Harvest: Developing a National System of
Individual Transferable Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381 (1995).
31. See Margaret Kriz, After Argentina, 30 NAT’L J. 2848, 2851 (1998).
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cause they are currently a matter of considerable interest in global
environmentalism, but also because they offer especially interesting
contrasts and comparisons with CPRs.  First, TEAs are like CPRs in
that they depart from the Hardin/Ophuls dyadic commons solution.
Instead of choosing between Leviathan and individual property,
TEAs combine the two: even though they allocate individual quotas
of the resource in question, TEAs are created and policed by gov-
ernments to a degree far surpassing conventional property rights.32
Second, and more interestingly, each TEA regime confronts exactly
the same problem that a CPR does—the problem of managing a large
renewable resource stock in a unitary fashion.
For both CPRs and TEAs, the dominating management task is to
retain the “core” or bulk of the resource stock—e.g., the  fishery, the
clean air mantle, or the groundwater aquifer—so that it can renew it-
self regularly.  But at the same time, both CPRs and TEAs must also
permit some use of the “fringe” of the resource in a limited manner,
so that consumption is compatible with the renewability of the un-
derlying resource stock.33  The CPR protects the core and allocates
the fringe through complex community norms; the TEA regime,
however, protects the core while allocating the fringe through indi-
vidual tradable allowances.34
III.  COMPARING TEAS TO CPRS
Shortly before the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Bruce
Ackerman and Richard Stewart described the steps that would be
necessary to put a TEA scheme in motion for the acid rain program.35
Borrowing loosely from their description, the process requires that
some governmental agency must do at least four things: first, set the
32. See, e.g., Rieser, Prescriptions, supra note 12, at 407-08 (describing governmental defi-
nition and distribution of tradeable quota in fisheries).
33. Another way to describe this relationship is that of a “stock” and “usufruct,” where
ownership of, e.g., a larger fishery stock resides with the community or the public, while indi-
viduals may claim the usufruct. See id. at 416 (describing the individual entitlement in fishing
TEAs as “in the nature of a usufructuary right,” i.e., the right to the fruits of someone else’s
property).
34. One precursor to modern hybrid property regimes was the scheme for managing hunt-
ing.  State statutes allocated individual hunting licenses annually, allowing some animals to be
taken but only at the level compatible with the stock’s regeneration the following year.  Modern
tradable allowance schemes differ from the hunting license chiefly in that they make these “li-
censes” tradable, so that entitlements presumably gravitate to those who most value them. See
Rose, Several Futures, supra note 16, at 171.
35. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988).
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total “fringe” amount of the resource that may be safely and sustain-
ably used; second, divide up and allocate that usable total in the form
of individual tradable allowances; third, set up a system for monitor-
ing and record-keeping; and fourth, enforce the limits both externally
(to exclude interlopers) and internally (to constrain insiders’ over-
use).36  “And that’s that,” said Ackerman and Stewart.37
Naturally, implementation of such a scheme has not been quite
as simple as “that’s that.”  In both actual and proposed measures for
TEAs, each of these steps has presented controversies and difficul-
ties.38  This article will not go into all the issues involved. Instead, it
will highlight the points at which these steps contrast with the meth-
ods of CPRs, because that contrast reveals much about both of these
forms of resource management.
A. Step 1: Setting the Total Allowable Resource Use
Clearly this is a task that is critical for maintaining a renewable
resource.  A mistake that sets the allowable “fringe” too high could
eat away at the core resource (e.g., too many fish landings destroy the
fish stock), while a mistake that sets the allowance too low could
needlessly thwart resource uses that are actually harmless.  Twentieth
century resource economists have considered this issue of total allow-
able use at length; according to the conventional wisdom, the correct
level of resource use should match a “maximum economic yield”
(MEY), reflecting a steady resource use level that creates greatest
revenue at lowest total cost.39
But more recent thinking on renewable resources suggests that
environmental factors are subject to “dynamic” or “chaotic” fluctua-
tions, and this considerably changes the picture of appropriate re-
source management.40  According to this new thinking, there may be
36. See id. at 184 (listing four distinct bureaucratic functions required by a new system of
marketable permits).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant, Global Warming: Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, An
Offset Policy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 645-46, 648 (1992) (describing
monitoring and administrative issues with respect to sulfur dioxide trading programs).
39. For an accessible description, see Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic
View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 11, at
311, 317.  Notice that MEY is a proposal of economists, replacing the earlier desideratum of
maximum sustainable use, MSY, proposed by biologists. See id. at 311-12, 317; H. Scott Gordon,
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 128
(1954) (discussing and criticizing the biological literature on economic grounds).
40. The implications of this new ecological paradigm were the subject of a prior Cummings
Colloquium. See Colloquy, Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New
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no smooth relationship between human catch levels and the remain-
ing stock of, say, a fish population.  Instead, the stock size may un-
dergo a much more jagged set of dynamic changes because of ebbs
and flows of weather conditions, changes in interrelated predator or
prey populations, or any of a number of other factors.  By the same
token, forests might have no natural climax state from which to cal-
culate a regular optimal cut.  Similarly, air or water pollution levels,
grazing, or species depredations might have unanticipated feedback
effects that bring about irreversible change.  If resource conditions
fluctuate in these discontinuous and unpredictable ways, then it may
be that the best management is not some optimal MEY, but rather a
procedural strategy of adaptive management, one focusing on shifting
away from stressed resources before their consumption reaches a
point of no return.41
1. TEAs
How do the modern TEA regimes deal with this problem of fluc-
tuation, particularly with respect to the issue of setting the allowable
total human use?  Interestingly enough, one of the most provocative
features of Ackerman and Stewart’s work was that they departed
from the resource economists’ argument for a particular periodic total
and instead discussed the matter in procedural terms.  They argued
that in contrast to command-and-control regimes, an advantage of a
tradable allowance scheme is that it has what are in effect beneficial
procedural consequences: a TEA proposal brings into the open the
all-important issue of permissible totals and encourages democratic
consideration of this issue.42
In taking a procedural tack, however, Ackerman and Stewart
were not particularly concerned about the dynamic pattern of envi-
ronmental change.  Moreover, their procedural hopes were not borne
out in the best-known example of a TEA regime, the 1990 reductions
in acid rain emissions; in the course of that legislation, there was very
little democratic discussion of appropriate total pollution levels at all,
much less a discussion of dynamic factors.  Instead, the consensus on
total allowable use converged on a “rollback” solution, setting a total
Ecology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1996). See also A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium
Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1121 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and
Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995)
41. See Townsend & Wilson, supra note 39, at 321-25.
42. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 35, at 188-89.
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limit at something less than the then-current sulfur dioxide levels.43
The more recent discussions of global greenhouse gas emissions seem
to have had a somewhat similar pattern: the consensus is that the total
allowable carbon dioxide emissions should simply be less, or more
precisely for the industrialized nations, emissions should be rolled
back to a few percentage points below 1990 levels.44
This is not to denigrate the concept of rollback.  Existing pollu-
tion levels may be an inevitable benchmark in the intensely political
opening stages of regulatory change, when current stakeholders have
so great an influence on policy decisions.45  Further, the rollback ap-
proach may indeed entail very considerable reductions in pollution, as
was the case with the 1990 Acid Rain amendments to the Clean Air
Act in the United States.46  Finally, a rollback can be readjusted in the
future, for still further rollback.47  Nevertheless, while the rollback
method does respond to the realities of a human political economy, it
does not address in any systematic way the new dynamic thinking
about environmental change, which rejects a “balance of nature” or
“steady state” view of environmental resources, whether established
by rollback or something else.
2. CPRs
What about CPRs, which must address the very same issue of
figuring out some total allowable consumption?  The impression one
has from much of the CPR literature is that the total “take” is only
rarely discussed explicitly in CPR communities. Instead, the total
consumption derives from the normative constraints that the commu-
nity places on its individual members, rather than the other way
around.48  For example, in the Swiss village of Toerbel, the citizens—
themselves limited in number—may not send any more cows to the
43. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14  STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
323-28 (1995) (arguing that debates over acid rain did not genuinely engage issue of total allow-
able pollution, instead relied on reduction from a particular annual baseline).
44. See Kriz, supra note 31, at 2850.
45. See GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (1989) (describing
motivations of stakeholders in a regulatory change and their tendency to evaluate the change by
comparison to the status quo).
46. See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
255 (1994) (noting that the 1990 amendments adopted a proposal to reduce total sulfur emis-
sions loading in air by 50 percent over a ten year period by requiring phased emissions reduc-
tions).
47. See J.W. Anderson et al., At Buenos Aires and Beyond, RESOURCES (Resources for the
Future, Washington, D.C.), Winter 1999, at 6, 8-9, available at <http://www.rff.org/resources_
archive/1999.htm>.
48. The relationships between totals and individual quotas are discussed in Seabright, su-
pra note 15, at 116-17 (describing how “production plan” is affected by “implementation plan”).
ROSE_FINAL_PAGEPROOF2 09/13/00  9:03 AM
56 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 10:45
hemselves limited in number—may not send any more cows to the
summer pasture than they can feed by themselves through the win-
ter,49 a constraint on individual farmers that naturally limits the total
pasturage consumed.  Similarly, the total number of lobsters fished
around Monhegan Island seems not to be discussed much by the lob-
stermen in any comprehensive manner, but rather derives from the
intricate norms about when, where, and how individuals may fish.50
Perhaps the question of total allowable use goes largely undis-
cussed simply because so many CPRs are enmeshed in community
tradition and rely on long-standing patterns of trial and error.  Or
perhaps the matter goes undiscussed because total stocks in many en-
vironmental resources, such as fish or wildlife, are not directly visi-
ble.51  Perhaps too, in at least some cases, the absence of specific
thinking about total use may reflect a pattern that has been noted re-
garding some traditionalist resource management, namely the belief
that human action has no effect on the natural environment.  In some
hunting and fishing communities, if the animals become scarce, the
reason is thought to be that the animals are displeased and are hiding
or that perhaps God simply wishes it to be so.  Scarcity in animals is
thus attributed to external factors or to the wildlife itself, rather than
to the hunt or to the actions of humans.  Indeed, in many hunting and
fishing communities it is thought to be disrespectful to the animals to
suggest otherwise.52
Although these views may reveal an attractive humility vis-á-vis
the environment, they also threaten to paralyze any effort to control
human encroachments on nature.  For that reason, such views could
make at least some CPRs vulnerable over the long run, particularly to
changes in human demand on resources.  This may be especially true
among isolated traditionalist peoples, whose CPR resources may have
been protected hitherto precisely by their isolation and low level of
49. See OSTROM, supra note 12, at 62 (citing Robert McC. Netting, What Alpine Peasants
Have in Common: Observations on Communal Tenure in a Swiss Village, 4 HUMAN ECOLOGY
135, 139 (1976)).
50. See Acheson, supra note 17, at 40, 46, 48-51.
51. By contrast, one CPR resource in which communities do appear to be attentive to peri-
odic totals is water level, which is more easily and directly discernible than the level of pollution
or the stocks of wildlife. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 12, at 72-74 (describing irrigators’ re-
sponses to overall water shortage); Bosselman, supra note 18, at 281-82 (describing medieval
English “fen” peoples’ responses to high or low water levels in wetlands).
52. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 16 (1994); James G. Carrier, Marine Tenure and Conservation in Papua
New Guinea: Problems in Interpretation, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 11, at
142, 153.
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commercial contacts with a wider world.  Opening these communities
to commerce could subject their resources to previously unheard-of
demand, and indeed to demand surges that could prove to be unman-
ageable under their traditional CPR practices.  A dramatic increase in
human demand seems to be the chief factor at work among the
Madagascar fishermen who are now hunting out the Radiated Tor-
toise; their traditional hunting practices presented no serious deple-
tion problems as long as the animals were killed only for an occa-
sional local feast, but those same practices have become an engine of
extinction now that worldwide demand encourages much more ag-
gressive capture of the animals.53
As will be discussed below, the complex structure of CPR enti-
tlements may sometimes provide a measure of insulation against de-
mand surges for endangered resources, even though structural com-
plexity is not always effective in preventing depletion.54  But aside
from complexity, there are other features of CPRs that offset their
relative haplessness about human demand change.  Even if some
CPRs are dangerously oblivious to changes in human demand—espe-
cially in isolated communities with little history of commercial con-
tact—their response to non-human, natural changes is quite another
story.
At least some CPRs seem remarkably adept at adjusting the total
take of a resource in ways that curiously presage the new thinking
about dynamic factors in environmental resources.  The old Swiss
villagers’ rule, permitting summer grazing only by those animals that
could be fed over the winter,55 is a prescription that is very likely to
track the fluctuating fertility of the pasture lands.  Similarly, partici-
pants in ancient Spanish irrigation areas employed and continue to
employ allocation rules that are keenly linked to amounts of water
available at any given time;56 Cree fur trappers regulate their catch
with close attention to the wildlife stock;57 indigenous hunting and
fishing communities extract various resources in successive “pulses,”
53. See Webster, supra note 2, at 27.
54. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
55. See OSTROM, supra note  12, at 62.
56. See id. at 72.
57. See Fikret Berkes, Indigenous Knowledge and Resource Management Systems: A Native
Canadian Case Study from James Bay, in PROPERTY RIGHTS IN A SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL
CONTEXT: CASE STUDIES AND DESIGN APPLICATIONS 99, 101 (Susan Hanna & Mohan
Munasinghe eds., 1995).
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readily shifting from one resource stock to the next at early signs of
scarcity.58
None of this is to romanticize CPRs, and certainly not to suggest
that all traditionalist practices are conservationist.  But it may be that
the chief weaknesses of CPRs revolve around unexpected shifts in
human demand—especially new confrontations with hitherto un-
known larger markets—rather than with dynamic shifts in other natu-
ral circumstances.  In general, what we know of the practices of long-
standing CPRs suggests that many are quite adaptive to the latter
circumstances.  These practices are marked by close attention to local
environmental conditions, by a fair number of periodic revisions, and
by rapid shifts to other resources in a diverse resource base when par-
ticular targets become scarce.
In short, CPRs sometimes demonstrate a kind of adaptive man-
agement that interestingly echoes the new thinking about dynamic
ecosystem change.59  In this critical dimension of responsiveness to
complex natural factors, some CPRs may have an advantage over
TEA regimes.  The great importance of the resource in CPRs, the
habits of constant attention to the resource and to other users, the
fact that users themselves are also the victims of any overuse, and the
generally diversified resource base—all these factors may permit
CPRs to adapt more effectively to chaotic environmental factors.
B. Steps 2 and 3: Defining, Allocating, and Keeping Track of
Individual Entitlements
The subjects of defining and allocating individual resource use
entitlements, as well as monitoring and keeping track of those indi-
vidual entitlements are all collapsed into a single discussion here.
Even though the interconnections among these aspects of entitle-
ments are not always immediately obvious, they are closely inter-
twined and have a number of feedback effects.
1. TEAs
Proponents of TEAs have devoted a considerable quantum of in-
tellectual energy to the question of how these hybrid rights might be
58. See, e.g., ARTHUR F. MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN
THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 27-32 (describing California native populations sea-
sonal use of different natural resources).
59. See Townsend & Wilson, supra note 39, at 321-25 (describing how new dynamic ecosys-
tem thinking stresses early species-switching rather than effort to maintain particular resource
quantities); see also Bosselman, supra note 18, at 285-86 (noting medieval English fen people’s
practices to preserve wetlands water levels, describing same as “adaptive management”).
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allocated at the outset to individual rights-holders.  Ackerman and
Stewart, like economic thinkers generally, proposed that TEAs be
allocated initially by auction,60 but in fact, historical use and pre-
existing practice have carried much more weight.  In the 1990 Acid
Rain amendments to the Clean Air Act, emission allowances were ef-
fectively “grandfathered” on the basis of historic emissions, even
though this seemed rather like granting the fox his previous ration of
chickens.61  Individual fishing quotas, both those in current practice
and those under discussion, are also allocated according to historic
catch or some other measure of pre-existing resource use.62  In current
discussions of greenhouse gases, we see some measure of reverse
grandfathering, as less developed countries insist that they should
have a chance either to catch up or be paid by those who are already
emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases.63
But however politically charged the initial allocation may be at
the opening stages of TEA regimes, in principle, successor entitle-
ment is vastly more important.  Indeed, this is the point of creating
TEAs.  Successor allocations are to be made through trade, and
hence, according to classic Coasean analysis, over time it will not mat-
ter what the initial entitlements were, because trade will allow enti-
tlements to flow toward those who place the highest value on them.64
That is what is supposed to make TEAs so useful; as with ordinary
private property, the prospect of trade should enhance the incentives
of rights-holders to innovate, specialize, and manage resources care-
fully.
The possibility for trading, however, means that questions con-
cerning rights-definition, record keeping, and monitoring are critically
important in TEA regimes.  Perhaps nowhere is this more true than
in global environmental schemes, due to their size and the distances
between relevant parties.  If rights are to be traded, they must be de-
fined in a simple fashion, so successors in interest will understand the
package of rights that they acquire.65  Further, transparent records
60. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 35, at 180-82.
61. See Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651(b)-(c) (Supp. 1999); Heinzerling,
supra note 43, at 331.
62. See Tipton, supra note 30, at 400-01.
63. See Kriz, supra note 31, at 2849 (noting that less developed countries are not required
to reduce greenhouse gases, though some have adopted voluntary limits in order to receive con-
trol investment from more developed countries).
64. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960).
65. See Carol M. Rose, What Governments Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in THE
FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 213
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must be kept so that various successive claimants can be apprised of
the claims that others have against their investments.  Still further,
monitoring is critical to reassure purchasers that they are not paying
for rights that others might be taking for free—a scenario that would
cause the whole tradable allowance scheme to unravel.
In existing and proposed TEA regimes, there are a number of
acute practical problems regarding this cluster of issues—rights-
definition, record-keeping, and monitoring—all of which cannot be
discussed here.66  But one systematic problem is that the need for
simplicity may run contrary to the ability to monitor.  For example,
with respect to fishing allowances, a TEA regime may employ a rela-
tively simple measure, as would be the case where an individual fish-
ing quota is measured in pounds or tons of a particular target fish.
But fishermen know that bigger fish bring more at the market than
smaller ones, and this can induce them to “high-grade,” keeping the
bigger fish and simply discarding the smaller (and now dead) speci-
mens, with potentially disastrous effects on the fish population as a
whole.67  “Pounds” of fish is a simple definition of entitlement, and it
can be measured easily at dockside; but as highgrading shows, this
kind of measure cannot be monitored easily where it matters envi-
ronmentally, that is, at the time of the catch at sea.
A second and particularly intriguing problem is a kind of “wag
the dog” issue: the quest for simplicity in TEAs has feedback effects
on what actually gets preserved.  Each TEA, in a sense, is like a
“chunk” of the consumable portion of the protected larger resource.
But because the chunks must be made simple and transparent, their
content may necessarily diverge from the overarching goal of pre-
serving the core resource; entitlements must be created in resource
features that can be identified, measured, and monitored, but careful
management of those features does not necessarily overlap with the
best protection for the resource in question.  For example, tradable
sulfur dioxide allowances are calculated in tons of emissions, because
(Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 664
(1998) (describing the importance of keeping property from “decomposing” into shards of sepa-
rate rights); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property, in 24 NOMOS 3, 9
(1982) (same).
66. For compliance issues with TEAs in the international arena, see Jonathan Baert Wie-
ner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677,
771-75 (1999).
67. See Philip A. Neher et al., Introduction to Ian N. Clark et al., The Development and
Implementation of New Zealand’s ITQ Management System, in RIGHTS-BASED FISHING, supra
note 30, at 113, 115.
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emissions by weight are relatively easy to measure and monitor.  But,
because of wind and weather conditions, emissions in some places
cause more damage to forests and lakes than do emissions in other
places.  Trading in the wrong direction, as it were, from emitters in
downwind or forested areas to upwind emitters, thus has the potential
to create greater damage than would be the case if rights could not be
traded and moved about.68  For this reason, some states’ efforts to
“meddle” with trades in emission rights are not simply frivolous, even
though these efforts can compromise trading regimes.69  In principle,
tradable rights could be more closely calibrated to location, but, in
practice, such closer refinements would be likely to make rights con-
siderably more complex and hence less easy to define, trade, and
monitor.
A similar problem is one that in another context I have called
“too much property.”70  This problem is really one of lopsidedness be-
tween what counts as property and what does not.  If certain envi-
ronmental subjects are defined as property (in part because the rights
are relatively easy to define), they will be treated carefully.  Some-
times, though, this occurs at the expense of non-“propertized” re-
sources that may be used with abandon.71  Owners of fish and shellfish
farms, for example, treat their stock with care, since those fish are
headed to market; but they feed their stock from wild fish that they
take indiscriminately as an unpropertized “free good.”72  The same
kind of problem can affect TEAs.  Consider water pollution: it is
much easier to define pollution allowances for end-of-the-pipe
“point” sources of pollution than for non-point sources, because point
sources can be measured and monitored much more easily than non-
point sources.  But, if point source discharges become propertized as
TEAs, dischargers might respond by evading the purchase of the
68. For a discussion of how trading can concentrate environmental harms in certain areas
or communities, see Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental In-
justice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
231, 251-58 (1999).
69. Cf. Wiener, supra note 66, at 787-88 (describing state efforts to prevent sales of pollu-
tion allowances to upwind sources as “meddling”).  Command-and-control regulation also often
focuses on things that can be measured and monitored, rather than on direct harms (e.g., point
sources rather than non-point sources); but, under such regulations, no trades exist to concen-
trate harms.
70. Rose, Several Futures, supra note 16, at 169-70.
71. See id. at 169-74.
72. See Biksham Gujja & Andrea Finger-Stich, What Price Prawn?  Shrimp Aquaculture’s
Impact in Asia, ENV’T, Sept. 1996, at 13, 15.  The article also cites careless uprooting of man-
grove trees and other elements of the aquatic ecosystem.
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TEA, and instead disperse wastes via non-point outlets—perhaps in
turn necessitating a second layer of command-and-control regulations
that mandate re-collection methods, such as lagoons for non-point
run-off materials.73
Ocean fishing or carbon dioxide emissions provide other exam-
ples of this phenomenon.  TEAs for specific ocean species may en-
courage careful treatment of those species, but they do little to en-
courage careful treatment of the “by-catch” of non-target species.74
Moreover, once a particular fish species is identified as the subject of
a TEA, fishermen may switch to other species that they can take “for
free,” even if over-fishing these non-target species disrupts the
greater habitat and ecosystem that nourishes all these species.75
Similarly, if fuel-burning utilities have to buy air pollution TEAs for
carbon dioxide emissions, they might find hydroelectric dams more
attractive—perhaps with the result that regulators must pay closer at-
tention to dams and to the harms they inflict on fish populations and
surrounding ecosystems.  In these instances of incomplete “properti-
zation,” TEAs in one area may necessitate further regulation in re-
lated areas, perhaps taking the form of new TEAs, but perhaps also
taking the form of new command-and-control regulation. 76
Finally, the imperative of rights-definition—and especially the
need for simplicity and security—can impede the ability of the regula-
tory regime to adapt.  For example, writers on fishing ITQs77 have
pointed out that, for the sake of security and investment, well-defined
individual fishing allowances might be allocated to a fixed number of
pounds per year over a long period of time.  The unhappy trade-off is
that these relatively simple and secure rights could make the fishing
regime as a whole rigid and less capable of dealing with future eco-
logical change.  On the other hand, more flexibly defined allowances,
such as those employing an annual percentage of the catch as a meas-
ure or those adopting allocations for a shorter period, are unfortu-
nately also less certain and hence less likely to encourage invest-
ment.78
73. See Rose, Several Futures, supra note 16, at 171-2.
74. See id. at 170.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 174; see also Hsu & Wilen, supra note 30, at 809 (arguing for IFQs in fishing,
but suggesting that other regulations might have to supplement them to control by-catch and
highgrading issues).
77. See supra text accompanying note 30.
78. For the arguments on these issues in New Zealand, see Tipton, supra note 30, at 411-12.
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2. CPRs
On all these issues surrounding individual entitlements, CPRs
regimes raise a very different, indeed almost diametrically opposed,
cluster of issues.  One important contrast concerns the allocation of
individual entitlements.  Unlike the explicit allocations under TEA
schemes, individual entitlements in CPRs may well be buried in tradi-
tion.  Moreover, some version of those traditions—rather than sales
and purchases—continue to dominate in successor entitlements, so
that the distinct between initial allocations and successor allocations
is not so marked as in TEAs.  In a CPR, what matters most for indi-
vidual entitlement is established membership in the community and
recognition under that community’s norms.  Although newcomers
may sometimes enter CPRs, perhaps through purchase of land within
the community, these would-be new entrants may well have to un-
dergo a seasoning period before being allowed full participation.
Thus, among the Monhegan lobster fishermen, land purchase on the
island can begin the entrance process into the fishing community, but
kinship relationships, long residence, and acknowledged skill are the
bases for the pecking order of choice fishing spots.79  This is not to say,
by the way, that these norms are always attractive or egalitarian;
women, for example, may be excluded.80
In another contrast, unlike the single-subject TEAs, CPR enti-
tlements are set in the context of multi-dimensional resource uses.
For example, CPRs for grazing may fold together such additional
practices as gathering, farming, and multi-species hunting and fish-
ing.81  In this context, CPR norms about individual uses tie the mem-
bers of a community to a whole complex web of economic resources,
rather than to any single one.  This pattern has consequences for re-
source conservation.  While CPR norms for resource use do not nec-
essarily guard against waste, irreversible exhaustion is less acute an
issue in a community whose members regularly drop one resource
and move on to another, in the way, for example, that traditional
79. See Acheson, supra note 17, at 40-45.  For other CPR rights transferred by sale of land,
see OSTROM, supra note 12, at 76 (mentioning that some Spanish community irrigation rights
may accompany sale of particular property).
80. For non-egalitarianism in communal living arrangements, see Ellickson, Property in
Land, supra note 21, at 1356.
81. See, e.g., MCEVOY, supra note 58, at 27-32 (describing complex resource base of Cali-
fornia tribal peoples).
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fishing communities readily switch to more bountiful stocks, allowing
the more depleted ones to recover.82
With such a complex web of resources, monitoring is certainly an
important issue in CPRs, as in TEAs.  Indeed, monitoring engages
and implicates the entire social structure of CPRs, since CPRs are
likely to exist only where there are rich opportunities for mutual
monitoring throughout the community.83  Moreover, as in TEA re-
gimes, monitoring issues have feedback effects on the ways that indi-
vidual entitlements are delineated.  This is visible in the case of the
old Spanish irrigation systems, where rights-holders are located in po-
sitions in which they can monitor one another.84  More generally,
CPRs tend to focus on “taking out,” or extractive, commons problems
such as forestry or fisheries, whereas they rarely if ever center on
“putting-in” commons problems like pollution.  This may be because
products of extractive activities—the logs cut or the fish caught—are
much easier to monitor than pollution; indeed, pollution may go un-
noticed (even by the polluters themselves), particularly insofar as
CPRs lack the sophisticated measurement technologies that are avail-
able to modern TEA regimes.
Unlike TEAs, CPRs’ norms for resource use do not generally
aim at simplicity.  Instead, CPRs can be very complex and can baffle
outsiders entirely. Even with respect to a single resource, individuals
in a CPR may hold nothing so simple and straightforward as a TEA;
they are more likely to have a series of complicated entitlements that
overlap with those of many other rights-holders.  For example, fish-
ermen in Palau have rights to fish in certain places along with other
rights to fish with certain equipment, and they are subject to an over-
arching norm of generosity that limits their ability to exclude others.85
Similarly, prior to European settlement in New Zealand, the Maori
had overlapping rights even in individual trees, where one family
could take the berries while another could take the fowl.86
82. See Townsend & Wilson, supra note 39, at 323-24 (describing the benefits of fishermen
switching stocks as one or other becomes more scarce).
83. See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 20, at 177-78 (describing “close-
knit” groups as the likely locus for common solutions to collective action problems).
84. See OSTROM, supra note 12, at 95 (describing manner in which Spanish irrigation rights
place participants in a position to monitor one another).
85. See Carrier, supra note 52, at 142, 147, 157-58.
86. See Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land, in 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 811 (1999)
(describing pre-settlement Maori ownership rights as “functional” rather than geographically
bounded and explaining their overlap on particular locations).
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Rights with these complex and interwoven characteristics can de-
tract from efficient resource use in important ways. Because individu-
als’ entitlements overlap with one another, individual incentives to
invest are diminished.  Equally important, because complex entitle-
ments cannot be easily traded, specialization and new entry are both
discouraged.  Essentially, complexity acts as a restraint on alienation;
as Michael Heller’s important new work points out, overly complex
entitlement structures can lead to a “Tragedy of the Anticommons,” a
situation of stasis in which overlapping rights-holders all can block
one another’s use of a given resource.87  CPRs seem to run this risk.
On the other hand, in the CPR context, complexity may have
some virtues that offset its defects.  Complex entitlement structures
encourage continuity in a CPR’s membership, because outsiders can-
not easily buy in and insiders cannot easily sell out.  This structure
provides a background condition of  “repeat play” among group
members, often said to be an important factor in solving collective ac-
tion problems; repeat play helps participants to build up cooperation
and trust, and hence it impedes breakdown from internal shirking and
cheating.88
Complex entitlement structures thus reinforce the internal sta-
bility of CPRs, but just as important for environmental protection is
the external protection that institutional complexity sometimes ad-
vances, although not always effectively.  Earlier in this article it was
mentioned that some commonly held resources may be preserved
simply by a low level of commercial exploitation and market penetra-
tion.89  Complex rights structures reduce commercial access because
complex entitlements are difficult to trade, but where commercial ac-
cess is limited in a given resource like, say, walrus tusk or turtle shell,
the market for those items remains undeveloped.  In turn, a con-
stricted market holds down the level of  exploitation of the resource.
This means that the complex entitlement structure of a CPR may also
be resource-conserving, in spite of the loss of specialization and in-
vestment that results from thwarting trade and commerce.  In that
87. See Heller, supra note 65, at 624; see also Banner, supra note 86, at 832-34 (arguing that
Maori division of property into many functional rights impeded shifts to potentially more prof-
itable uses, diminishing individual incentives).  But see Smith, supra note 13, at 146-52 (arguing
that overlapping entitlements in medieval scattered fields helped to limit opportunistic overuse
of commons by individuals).
88. See Seabright, supra note 15, at 117-18 (describing economists’ view that repeat play
can induce players to overcome the Prisoners’ Dilemma), 122-23 (discussing trust in local com-
mon property regimes).
89. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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sense, however crude the mechanism, complex entitlement structures
may offset some of the vulnerability of CPR resources to changes in
human demand—a demand change that is especially likely to flow
from commercial contact.
More generally, Robert Ellickson points out that common prop-
erty regimes effectively pool access to resources, and for this reason
these regimes are particularly adapted to managing risk.90  This is a
very useful insight for some environmental resources.  Environmental
resources are likely to be riskier than, say, land, the quintessential
subject of property rights—and as all farmers know, land itself is
plenty risky.91  But the annual wild berry supply or the year’s salmon
run may be riskier still.  As between the pooled claims of CPRs on
the one hand, and the individual claims of TEAs on the other, it could
be that CPR pooling is at least sometimes better adapted to human
interactions with these risk-laden and highly variable resources. That
is, at least in some instances of human interaction with fluctuating en-
vironmental resources, the value of risk spreading may dominate the
payoffs from individual incentives and specialization—payoffs that
are associated with more sharply defined and permanent property en-
titlements.
C. Step 4: Enforcement
Within particular governments, enforcement in TEA regimes can
borrow from the whole range of civil and criminal processes.  In the
international arena, on the other hand, appropriate sanctions are es-
pecially difficult to attain, since the underlying institutional structure
for sanctions is so attenuated.  Putting aside that important and much-
discussed problem,92 there is another difficulty that pervades the en-
forcement of TEAs, even within existing sovereign governments.
TEAs envision impartial enforcement by governmental agents, but
one systematic concern about such enforcement, even within well-
90. See Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 21, at 1341-44, 1392-93 (“Group owner-
ship . . . pools risk.  Because most individuals are risk-averse, the risk-spreading feature of group
property is advantageous – even decisive in certain situations.”).
91. See Douglas W. Allen & Dean Lueck, The Nature of the Farm, 41 J.L. & ECON. 343
(1998) (arguing that natural fluctuations and diverse stages of resource production limits the
advantages of specialization, often making the unspecialized “family farm” more appropriate
than more rationalized agribusiness).
92. For a discussion about constructing and enforcing international environmental agree-
ments, see Scott Barrett, International Cooperation and the International Commons, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 131 (1999); David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law:Implications
for an Effective Global Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 147 (1999).
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organized governments, is that of motivating the enforcers.  Acker-
man and Stewart expressed the hope that in TEA regimes, this moti-
vation would come from the regulated entities themselves, since buy-
ers of environmental allowances would have an interest in monitoring
cheaters and making sure that the rules were enforced for all.93  But in
fact, these endogenous incentives for enforcement are rather limited.
They do operate where resource users are in competition.  For exam-
ple, if a mining company has to buy TEAs for pollution discharge, it
wants to be sure that its competitors have to bear this expense as well.
But it is hard to see why the company would care very much if a non-
competitor, such as a paper mill or a municipality, were to dump still
more pollutants into the water, unless their pollution was so great as
to raise the price of the mining company’s TEAs.  When TEAs apply
to large numbers of heterogeneous uses of a resource, enforcement is
likely to have to come from government officials acting on their own.
In CPRs, once again, things are quite different. Here, with re-
spect both to overreaching insiders and encroaching outsiders, en-
forcement is classically all a matter of self-help.  CPRs have a great
range of enforcement techniques, ranging from gossip to ostracism to
violence.94  The milder forms of enforcement against norm-violating
insiders, notably gossip, probably present few incentive problems, be-
cause these activities are likely to be enjoyed by the members of the
CPR community.  But at the more serious end of the spectrum, en-
forcement can be an arduous, unpleasant, and dangerous task, and
even CPRs do not escape problems regarding motivating enforce-
ment.
Serious under-enforcement can unravel a CPR, just as it can un-
dermine a TEA regime.  Hence, successful CPRs often develop sec-
ondary enforcement norms; that is, the participants think they are
duty-bound to chastise shirkers, cheaters, and interlopers.  But even
when successful at motivating enforcement, these secondary norms
can have problems as well.  Jon Elster describes “norms of revenge”
in Balkan communities, where honor dictates norm enforcement
against violators, but where the more violent forms of reprisal can cy-
cle into wasteful and disruptive vendettas.95  Such problems are in
some measure the result of self-help and the accompanying lack of
93. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 35, at 183.
94. See ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, supra note 20, at 56-59.
95. Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862, 866-71 (1990) (describing norm en-
forcement through “honor” among Montenegrans and their pervasiveness of feuds); see also
OSTROM, supra note 12, at 74-76 (noting similar problems in irrigating communities).
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impartial, third-party arbiters.  That is why, as John Locke mildly put
it, self-help can be “inconvenient.”96  It is significant that the members
of one frequently mentioned CPR, the lobster fishermen of Mon-
hegan Island in Maine, very much desired the state’s help in keeping
out interlopers, and they ultimately convinced the state to help them
ban outsiders from their lobster-fishing grounds.97
Thus, once again, CPRs and TEAs offer contrasting strengths
and weaknesses: TEAs are at a disadvantage with respect to internal
motivation to enforce, but at an advantage with respect to impartiality
and the containment of vendettas; CPRs are just the reverse, having
an advantage with respect to motivation but a disadvantage with re-
spect to partisanship and feuding.
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
What do we learn from this comparison of TEAs and CPRs?  A
very interesting point is the degree to which these organizational
forms are mirror images; the strengths of one are apt to be the weak-
nesses of the other, and vice versa.
TEA regimes are clearly advantageous for organizing interac-
tions among strangers.  They can mediate relationships among those
strangers and encourage new entrants to participate in environmental
management, and they seem especially suited to widely dispersed and
more or less fungible resources like sulfur dioxide or perhaps carbon
dioxide.  CPRs, on the other hand, depend on and take advantage of
close and stable existing relationships, and they seem especially suited
to complex and locally dense resource clusters.  Insofar as global en-
vironmental problems concern resources that have local densities—
where, for example, a local forest ecosystem may absorb greenhouse
gases or provide habitat for a particular species—CPRs may have
special salience.  Moreover, they may be especially attractive where
there are independent reasons to hold together a particular commu-
nity, as for example in the efforts to maintain threatened indigenous
or traditional peoples.
Still other important contrasts between TEAs and CPRs emerge
in their very different entitlement structures.  Precisely because they
96. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 396-97 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (arguing that people’s partiality to themselves mean that “Passion and
Revenge is very apt to carry them too far” and noting the “inconveniencies” of self-help).
97. See Acheson, supra note 17, at 60 (describing the islanders’ wish for state enforcement);
Maine Limits Fishing for Island’s Lobster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at A25 (describing law for
the first time limiting lobster fishing to the islanders).
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are contemplated to be tradable among strangers, TEAs are designed
for simplicity and security.  But while those features encourage trade
and investment, the very same features can impede TEAs’ adaptabil-
ity in the face of overlapping and interacting environmental factors or
of natural environmental change over time.  By contrast, CPR enti-
tlement structures, while much more complex and a much greater im-
pediment to investment and trade, are also more multidimensional,
and for that reason they may also allow more flexible responses to in-
termixed resources and to dynamic environmental change.
Questions of enforcement offer yet more contrasts between
TEAs and CPRs.  TEAs can deploy a great range of impersonal en-
forcement devices, with the advantages that impersonality brings; but
they enlist private enforcement only sporadically, at best in overtly
competitive situations.  CPRs, on the other hand, are enforced at
closer range and enlist personal and community policing.  But they
may unravel in the case of non-enforcement, or decline into vendetta
in the case of personalized enforcement; just as seriously, they may be
simply incapable of dealing with resource problems like many forms
of pollution, whose monitoring is beyond the technical capacity of a
small community.
If there is one feature that may give an overall advantage to TEA
regimes, it is the simple fact of their greater explicitness. TEAs are
much more explicit than CPRs about goals, procedures, rights struc-
tures, and enforcement.  In this explicitness, TEAs can encourage an
open and educative discussion of all their elements, even though the
opportunity for discussion does not always result in close practical
consideration, as in the case of sulfur dioxide totals in the 1990 Clean
Air Act.98  By contrast, CPR regimes are not so explicit, and hence
they may not be geared to learning about new resource problems,
particularly those induced by human ingenuity and human demand;
there are far too many examples of CPRs that simply fail to respond
to new levels of demand on some resource previously thought unim-
portant, as in the case of Madagascar’s Radiated Tortoises.  Over
time, communities with CPRs obviously do learn about ways to man-
age new environmental problems.  If they did not, CPRs would not
exist at all and certainly would not exist over their sometimes very
long histories.  One cause for concern, however, is that communities
with CPRs will not learn quickly enough to deal with rapid changes
induced by new market penetrations.  The complex structure of CPRs
98. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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sometimes shields them from such market-driven changes, but this
clearly is not always enough.
TEAs and CPRs, then, present a study in contrasts.  The
strengths of TEAs derive from their impersonality, their simplicity
and explicitness, their usefulness for diffuse and wide-ranging re-
sources, their openness to new entry, and their adaptability to
changes in human demand.  CPRs’ strengths are just the reverse: their
deployment of personal bonds and deeply felt norms, their complex-
ity, their stability of membership, their usefulness for locally dense
and interactive resources, and their responsiveness to natural change
in interwoven resources.  By these very contrasts, CPRs and TEAs
signal both the dimensions in which each will be effective, as well as
the dimensions in which each may require supplementation.
One interesting development in global environmentalism is the
dawning realization that these two different management structures
can to some degree be combined or at least mixed.  This is exempli-
fied in Alison Rieser’s suggestion that some tradable fishing quotas
might be allocated to communities rather than to individuals, and in
Lee Breckenridge’s argument that both ecosystem and human rights
concerns might be advanced by recognizing communal resource rights
in some indigenous peoples.99
There are still more opportunities for combining hybrid property
and CPRs.  One such opportunity is reflected in an intriguing devel-
opment that has emerged from the new TEA regimes for fishing:
some holders of individual fishing quotas, realizing the need to pre-
serve the surrounding ecosystem, are coming together to form what
are effectively new CPRs for the conservation of fishing habitat.100
This voluntary joint action is rather similar to a phenomenon that
Robert Merges describes in connection with copyright and patent
pooling: in that arena, owners of governmentally-created individual
intellectual property rights have joined forces in organizations that
help to solve common problems.101
This same basic structure—a combination of hybrid, governmen-
tally created property rights and CPRs—underlies the programs that
99. See Rieser, Property Rights, supra note 24; Breckenridge, supra note 25.
100. See Rieser, Property Rights, supra note 24, at 823-24.  Rieser apparently does not think
these ad hoc agreements are sufficient for ecosystem preservation. Cf. Rieser, Prescriptions, su-
pra note 12, at 417 (criticizing ITQs for failing to incorporate institutional frameworks within
which holders can cooperate with other parties to maintain a healthy ecosystem).
101. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293-1330, 1355-58 (1996).
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currently enlist local villagers and agricultural communities in the
preservation of game parks and forests.102  Communities that receive
new rights to wildlife revenues have a stake in preserving the stock of
animals, and they may also create new CPR norms among themselves
and among other communities to address common problems, as, for
example, in the reporting of poachers.103  These kinds of combinations
are among the most interesting developments in environmental law
and property law as well, and they deserve the support of our legal in-
stitutions.
Here it is appropriate to return to Garrett Hardin and his view of
the “tragedy of the commons,” because the comparison of TEAs and
CPRs sheds light on that famous metaphor.  As was observed earlier
in this article, the New Institutional Economics literature takes direct
issue with Hardin for his failure to notice CPRs as an intermediate
approach to commons problems.  The TEA regimes of recent years
constitute an indirect reproach of Hardin’s work as well, since TEAs
contemplate hybrid regimes that combine Leviathan with individual
property.  Moreover, it now appears that these two quite different
commons management schemes can sometimes be mixed in further
combinations.  All of these variations argue strongly that the Har-
din/Ophuls dyadic approach to commons management—private
property or Leviathan’s coercion—is far too narrow.
But there is another criticism of Hardin that is particularly rele-
vant to issues of the global commons.  Hardin’s chief concern was the
largest of global commons, population growth, or as he bluntly put it,
the unfettered “freedom to breed.”104  On this subject of population
growth, however, neither coercion (as in legal limits on childbearing)
nor property rights (as in tradable licenses to have children) seem ei-
ther feasible or attractive.
But, upon reflection, Hardin stated the problem far too grossly.
Population pressures can be broken down into much more specific
pressures on particular resources, such as human pressures on air, wa-
ter, forests, and wildlife.  In some ways, the control of these pressured
resources is more manageable than direct constraint on population
itself. And upon still further reflection, those more specific resources
102. One well-known program is Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme
for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).  See Victoria Butler, Is This the Way to Save Africa’s
Wildlife?, INT’L WILDLIFE, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 38, 38; Karl Hess, Jr., Wild Success: African
Wildlife, REASON, Oct. 1997, at 32, 36-41.
103. See Butler, supra note 102, at 38-39; Hess, Jr., supra note 102, at 38.
104. Hardin, supra note 4, at 1246.
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themselves can be further broken down into even more localized or
locally dense resources: the local forest that can purge air pollutants,
the local wetland ecosystem that can purify water, and the network of
localized ecosystems and forests that can provide wildlife habitat.
To be sure, these locally dense resources require larger coordina-
tion.  But when we subdivide the most general commons issues into
more local ones, and when we then recombine these local commons
into larger networks, it becomes clear that it is not simply the com-
mons solutions that are more variegated than the Hardin/Ophuls
dyad of “property or Leviathan.”  The very idea of the commons itself
is enormously variegated. The comparison of newfangled tradable
environmental allowances to old-fashioned common property re-
gimes, and the recombinations of these approaches into still new mix-
tures, allows us to see an expanded set of choices for global environ-
mental management.  But just as important, the comparison and
combination of these regimes is a reminder that there is not a single
commons or even a few global commons in the world; rather, there is
a tapestry of constituent large and small commons, interacting and
overlapping in ways that are as subtle as the environment itself.
